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Introduction 
As an EU citizen, do I have a right to clean drinking water? Or do I have a right to be free from 
significant pollution? These are both substantive environmental rights, entitling me to a given level of 
environmental quality. The answer to both questions is probably ‘yes’, but the real issue is, in the first 
example, whether this kind of explicit rights framing has been particularly visible and, in the second, 
the extent to which this right is ever likely to be practically enforced in a specifically EU context. 
Post-Aarhus, we have seen the rise and rise of procedural environmental rights in the EU. While their 
substantive cousins exist in theory, they have remained very much in the shadows as far as use by the 
environmental movement is concerned. The aim of the current chapter is to explore this puzzle. I 
examine the current status of substantive EU environmental rights and seek to explain why it is that a 
potentially salient group of rights has failed to fulfil its promise. In the case of legislative substantive 
rights, I argue that the lack of a juridical need for a right within direct effect is a key factor and, with 
fundamental substantive rights, that it is a feature of both redundancy and restrictive precedent.   
 
Environmental Rights 
At the outset it is necessary to establish what is meant by ‘environmental rights’ in the context of the 
current chapter. In the wider literature and campaigning, the phrase is sometimes used to refer to 
rights enjoyed by, or on behalf of the environment itself. This may be termed an ‘ecocentric’ 
approach. However, more common in terms of judicial practice is for environmental rights to take the 
form of rights to a clean or healthy environment. These are anthropocentric rather than ecocentric 
rights because the relevant right is reserved for humans. While the environment may benefit indirectly 
from the enforcement of such rights, the environment itself has no standing under such an approach – 
only humans have a right to a clean or healthy environment. Such rights may be explicitly expressed 
in this way, for example in a national constitution. Thus the constitution of Hungary states in Article 
21 that ‘Hungary shall recognise and enforce the right of every person to a healthy environment.’ 
Alternatively, as in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the rights to a 
healthy environment may be ‘derived’ rights, whereby newer environmental rights are derived from 
the older, pre-existing rights already found within the Convention architecture, such as the right to life 
(Article 2) or the right to home and family life (Article 8).1 The latter right under Article 8 is the most 
                                                          
1 See generally: T Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2005). 
highly developed and well known of the ECHR environmental rights and has been widely employed 
in severe pollution cases, where the European Court of Human Rights has often been persuaded that 
such pollution of the home amounts to an infringement of the right to home and family life.2 
 
Substantive Versus Procedural Rights 
The above rights to a clean and healthy environment – whether express or derived in nature – are a 
form of ‘substantive’ environmental right. There are also ‘procedural’ environmental rights. These 
involve not a right to a particular substantive environmental quality or outcome but, rather, to enjoy 
certain procedural rights in connection with the environment. Among the best known contemporary 
examples of such rights are those found in the UN/ECE Aarhus Convention on access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in relation to the environment. The 
Convention provides for rights of access to environmental information, rights to participate in public 
decision-making on environmental matters and rights for the public to be able to gain access to the 
courts or other appropriate review procedures in cases involving the environment. The ECHR has also 
been used to create procedural environmental rights. Article 6, for example, which involves an 
obvious procedural right in the shape of a right to a hearing, has been used frequently in 
environmental cases. And even the otherwise more substantive-looking Articles 2 and 8, have, with 
Aarhus influence (considered further below), had procedural elements built into them.3 
In Europe (both EU and ECHR), it is fair to say that while substantive environmental rights arrived on 
the scene first, procedural environmental rights have enjoyed a much more prominent role in recent 
years. It is beyond the scope of the current chapter to address the reasons for this procedural turn, but 
the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention in October 2001 has undoubtedly played a key part in it. 
Both the EU4 and the ECHR5 have been significantly affected by Aarhus. 
While we now find ourselves in a situation where we have both substantive and procedural 
environmental rights, one might raise a question about whether the recent dominance of procedural 
rights is an altogether positive development.6 Again, while this is beyond the scope of the current 
chapter, suffice it to say that although there are undoubtedly significant advantages associated with 
the new procedural rights, substantive environmental rights produce a much more direct ‘hit’ and are 
therefore likely to enjoy higher salience. A procedural right, if won, gives an individual or group the 
right to enter or use a procedure, which may or may not then produce the substantive result desired. 
The substantive result is, in other words, one stage removed or indirect. A substantive right, in 
contrast, provides direct access to the desired result in successful cases. 
                                                          
2 eg Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277; Fadeyeva v Russia (2007) 45 EHRR 10. 
3 A Boyle 'Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment' (2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law Review 471; C 
Hilson, ‘Risk and the European Convention on Human Rights: Towards a New Approach’ (2009) 11 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 353; O Pedersen, ‘The Ties that Bind: The Environment, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2010) 16 European Public Law 571. 
4 eg Council Decision 2005/370/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access 
to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
Matters [2005] OJ L124/1;  Regulation 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on access 
to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters to Community 
institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L264/13; Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ 
L41/26; Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council 
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L156/17. 
5 See Boyle (n 3); Hilson (n 3); Pedersen (n 3). 
6 Hayward (n 1). 
 Legislative Rights Versus Fundamental Rights 
When considering substantive environmental rights, a final distinction needs to be drawn between 
legislative rights and fundamental rights because substantive environmental rights can be found in 
both categories. Legislative rights are those found mainly in EU Directives. Some, invariably 
procedural, environmental Directives employ the express language of rights in their provisions. For 
the majority however, rights can be viewed as correlatives in a Hohfeldian sense to the obligations or 
duties owed by Member States to citizens under those Directives.7 
Fundamental EU environmental rights consist of those in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
those found in, or derived from, the ECHR (with the latter, the Court will have absorbed them into its 
own internal doctrine of fundamental rights as part of the ‘general principles of law’) and, finally, 
rights derived from national constitutions. As de Sadeleer has observed of ECHR-related rights: 
‘although EU law does not specify a self-executing right to environmental protection, such a right 
emerges in the wake of fundamental rights enshrined by the ECHR.’8 These ECHR rights include 
both substantive rights under, for example, Article 8 (home and family life) and Article 2 (right to 
life) and procedural rights under, for example, Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 8 again.  
ECHR jurisprudence on environmental rights is now substantial, and includes cases ranging from 
airport noise (Hatton),9 pollution risks from coal fired power stations (Okyay)10 and gold mines 
(Tașkin),11 through to failures to provide warnings about risk (Guerra, Budayeva).12 However, the 
CJEU has studiously avoided referencing any ECHR environmental case law in its own judgments. 
While there are some references to ECHR articles like articles 6, 8 and 13 by Advocates General or by 
parties,13 the Court itself does not currently tend to frame its environment-related judgments in 
Convention terms.14 If it mentions rights, this will typically only be the Charter or existing EU general 
principles of law. 
As regards the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, although it contains an explicit environmental 
article, this is expressed more as a programmatic principle than a judicially enforceable right. Article 
37 states: 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the 
environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with 
the principle of sustainable development.  
                                                          
7 C Hilson and T Downes, ‘Making Sense of Rights: Community Rights in E.C. Law’ (1999) 24 EL Rev 121. 
8 N de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market (Oxford, OUP, 2014). See also F Ermacora, ‘The Right to 
a Clean Environment in the Constitution of the European Union’ in J Jans (ed), The European Convention and the Future of 
European Environmental Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003); and S de Abreu Ferreira, ‘Fundamental 
Environmental Rights in EU Law: An Analysis of the Right of Access to Environmental Information’ in D Pavlich (ed), 
Managing Environmental Justice (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2010). 
9 Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28. 
10 Okyay and Others v Turkey (2006) 43 EHRR 37. 
11 Taşkin and Others v Turkey (2006) 42 EHRR 50. 
12 Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357; Budayeva and Others v Russia (2014) 59 EHRR 2. 
13 eg Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami [2014] 1 CMLR 54; Case C‑ 28/09 Commission v Austria, EU:C:2011:854; 
Case C-463/11 L v M [2013] Env LR 35. 
14 See eg Commission v Austria (n 13). Although eg art 8 ECHR was raised as a justification by Austria in the case for its 
trans-Alpine lorry restrictions (paras 83, 118), the Court does not mention art 8. Cf earlier case law where, in Case C-112/00 
Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, the Court did refer to arts 10 and 11 of the ECHR on freedom of expression and 
assembly in constructing fundamental rights as a potential justification for restriction on free movement of goods caused by 
an environmental anti-motorway protest. 
Although Article 37 may be legally justiciable in limited circumstances,15 this will be as a principle 
rather than a right, with the Charter making a narrow distinction between the two.16 This does not 
mean that environmental rights do not exist under the Charter. They do, but it is simply that, as with 
the development of ECHR jurisprudence on the environment, the Charter’s environmental rights 
(which broadly mirror the equivalent ECHR rights) are ‘derived’ rights based on other rights in the 
Charter such as the right to life in Article 2, the right to private and family life in Article 7 and the 
right to property in Article 17. Again, as with the ECHR above, the Charter-based fundamental rights 
may be substantive or procedural in nature, with the right to property an example of the former and 
the Article 47 right to an effective remedy and fair trial an obvious example of the latter. 
As for national constitutional provisions, these have only ever been referenced by Advocates General 
and then only in passing as a whole (as ‘national constitutional traditions’) rather than a mention of 
specific national constitutions.17 Even there, these are not the environment-specific substantive 
constitutional traditions being cited (eg Article 21 of the Hungarian constitution, mentioned earlier), 
but rather procedural ones like the right to effective judicial protection.18 
 
Legislative Rights 
Much of the early interest and controversy surrounding EU environmental rights involved the 
Hohfeldian legislative type, where, rather than being expressly stated, the right was a correlative to a 
Member State obligation set out in an environmental directive. These are what one might call ‘silent’ 
rights and the case law falls into three categories: incorrect transposition; direct effect; and state 
liability. 
Incorrect Transposition 
The incorrect transposition case-law involves Member States failing to transpose Directives into 
national law in a form which provides sufficient legal certainty to enable individuals to enforce them 
in national courts. The first Court of Justice case of this type involved Directive 77/452 on Nursing 
Qualifications,19 with the Court stating that ‘where the directive is intended to create rights for 
individuals, the legal position arising from those principles [must be] sufficiently precise and clear [so 
that] the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the 
possibility of relying on them before the national courts.’20 In the two following environmental cases 
involving the Wild Birds Directive 79/409,21 the Court made no mention at all of rights, emphasising 
instead that faithful transposition is ‘particularly important in a case where the management of the 
common heritage is entrusted to the Member States’.22 The Court was obviously reluctant to refer 
back to the Nursing case and its rights formulation here in a nature conservation context. To suggest 
                                                          
15 S Bogojević, ‘EU Human Rights Law and Environmental Protection: The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship?’ in S 
Douglas-Scott and N Hatzis (eds), EU Human Rights Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015); de Sadeleer (n 8). 
16 C Hilson ‘Rights and Principles in EU law: A Distinction Without Foundation?’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 193; de Sadeleer (n 8). 
17 L v M (n 13) AG Wathelet. 
18 ibid. 
19 [1977] OJ L176/1. 
20 Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661 [23]. 
21 [1979] OJ L103/1. After amendment, this subsequently became Directive 2009/147/EC [2010] OJ L20/7. 
22 Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands [1990] I-851 [28]; Case 252/85 Commission v France [1988] ECR 2243 [5]. 
The Court has kept this formulation for the Birds Directive to this day: see eg Case 247/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] 
ECR 3029 [9]; Case C-38/99 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-10941 [53]; Case C-60/05 WWF Italia and Others v 
Regione Lombardia [2006] ECR I-5083 [24]; Case C-418/04 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-10947 [64], [159]. 
that such Directives confer rights on individuals would have been possible, though more ecocentric 
than one might expect from the Court. However, in the subsequent cases – involving environmental 
directives with no express rights contained within them – it found itself able to employ the rights 
wording. In a case involving the Groundwater Directive 80/68/EEC,23 the Court declared that the 
Directive conferred rights on individuals, making no link with public or human health at this stage.24 
However, thereafter, the Court did frequently make such a link, ruling that environmental directives 
which were designed to protect public health involved individual rights. Directives explicitly 
identified as such included the Surface Water for Drinking Directives 75/440/EEC25 and 
79/869/EEC,26 the Lead in Air Directive 82/884/EEC,27 the Fish and Shellfish Waters Directives 
78/659/EEC28 and 79/923/EEC,29 and the Air quality (Sulphur Dioxide and Suspended Particulates) 
Directive 80/779/EEC.30 Although this link between health and rights was frequent, it seems to have 
been confined to environmental directives involving substantive environmental quality. Thus in an 
incorrect transposition case involving the procedural Access to Environmental Information Directive 
90/313/EEC,31 the Court employed its standard rights framing even in the absence of a connection 
with health.32 Of course in this case neither were the rights silent – express rights of access are at the 
core of that particular directive.33 
Direct Effect 
The Court of Justice of the EU has over the years moved to constitutionalise the EU treaties, 
emphasising that many of the obligations or duties owed by Member States in the Treaties and in 
legislation such as Directives create rights for citizens that are enforceable in their national courts. 
This forms the basis of the EU law doctrine of ‘direct effect’. Back in the 1990s, there was a 
significant debate as to whether rights were a condition of direct effect or a consequence of it. 
Borrowing from the incorrect transposition case law, some suggested that rights were indeed a prior 
condition for direct effect and that such rights were limited to directives which were aimed at 
protecting human health.34 There were of course some overlaps between incorrect transposition and 
direct effect – not least the emphasis by the Court in both on a need for clarity and precision (as a 
condition for direct effect and as a quality of transposition35 respectively). However, the incorrect 
transposition case law is fundamentally about enabling individuals to rely on EU rights that have been 
                                                          
23 [1980] OJ L20/43. Repealed by the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC [2000] OJ L327/1. 
24 Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825. 
25 [1975] OJ L194/26. 
26 [1979] OJ L271/44. Case C-58/89 Commission v Germany [1991] I-4983. 
27 Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607. 
28 [1978] OJ L222/1. Later consolidated into Directive 2006/44/EC [2006] OJ L264/20. 
29 [1979] OJ L281/47 (later consolidated into Directive 2006/113/EC [2006] OJ L376/14). Case C-298/95 Commission v 
Germany [1996] ECR I-6747. 
30 [1980] OJ L229/30 (subsequently repealed – see now Directive 2008/50/EC [2008] OJ L152/1. Case C-361/88 
Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567. 
31 [1990] OJ L158/56. 
32 Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-5087, [31]-[32], [37]. See also Case C-530/11 Commission v UK 
[2014] 3 C.M.L.R. 6, [34]-[35] (which involved a challenge to UK judicial costs rules as incorrect transposition of Directive 
2003/35/EC on public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2003] OJ L156/17); 
C-427/07 Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR I-6277, [54]-[56] (also involving Directive 2003/35/EC). 
33 Similarly for Cases C-530/11 and C-427/07 (n 32). 
34 See eg C Hilson, ‘Community Rights in Environmental Law: Rhetoric or Reality’ in J Holder (ed), The Impact of EC 
Environmental Law in the United Kingdom (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1997). 
35 In Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (n 30) the Court states: ‘the transposition of a directive into domestic law does 
not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general 
legal context may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose, provided that it does indeed 
guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is 
intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where 
appropriate, rely on them before the national courts’ [15, emphasis added]. 
properly transposed into national law without needing to rely on them directly via direct effect (and, 
furthermore, the Court has also emphasised that the ability to invoke direct effect is no excuse for 
incorrect transposition36). And just because the Court had said that certain types of environmental 
directives confer rights for the purposes of incorrect transposition, does not mean that rights are a 
condition for direct effect and that direct effect is limited to, for example, environmental directives 
aimed at protecting human health. To make such a leap is, in Prechal and Hancher’s terms, to engage 
in a form of ‘conceptual pollution’.37 
Hence, where an EU environmental directive is not intended to protect human health (but, say, to 
protect the ecological environment itself), it does not mean that it will not be enforceable at the suit of 
individuals or groups in national courts.38 If the relevant provisions of such a directive satisfy the 
conditions which the Court has laid down for direct effect (that they be sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional39), then they will be enforceable. Enjoyment of a right is not itself a condition for direct 
effect. 
However, the fact that rights turned out not to be a condition for direct effect is, I would argue, 
something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand it is of course an advantage that the scope of 
direct effect for environmental directives has not been limited by being restricted to a class of 
directives which confer rights on individuals. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it means that the 
currency of rights framing – which has been so powerful in other contexts such as civil and LGBT 
rights – has not had the opportunity to take hold in relation to substantive directives with silent rights. 
To illustrate this argument, one can take as examples two UK substantive cases decided around 
twenty years apart. The first is the 1994 Friends of the Earth (FoE) judicial review challenge of a UK 
government enforcement decision in relation to national legislation designed to implement the 
Drinking Water Directive.40 Rights were pleaded41 in the case itself,42 no doubt in part because of the 
uncertainty about whether rights were a condition of direct effect or not. However, rights were hardly 
mentioned in associated FoE publicity surrounding the case. A letter to The Times newspaper from 
                                                          
36 Case 29/84 (n 20): ‘In particular a Member State cannot rely on the direct effect of the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality in order to evade the obligation to incorporate into domestic law a directive which is intended 
precisely to give that principle practical effect by facilitating the effective exercise of freedoms proclaimed in the Treaty’ 
[21]. 
37 Sacha Prechal and Leigh Hancher, 'Individual Environmental Rights: Conceptual Pollution in EU Environmental Law' 
(2002) 2 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 89. 
38 P Wennerås, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007). 
39 Even if the relevant provision does not satisfy the unconditionality requirement for direct effect (meaning there should be 
no discretion left to Member States by the provision), the environmental directive may still be legally mobilised in national 
courts. And that is because the Court of Justice has come up with a parallel legal doctrine to direct effect, which has been 
referred to as ‘legality review’ (C Hilson 'Legality Review of Member State Discretion Under Directives' in T Tridimas and 
P Nebbia (eds), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Volume 1 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004). Indeed, 
some commentators regard legality review as part and parcel of direct effect rather than a separate doctrine: S Prechal, 'Does 
Direct Effect Still Matter?' (2000) 37 CML Rev 1047; Wennerås (n 38); J Jans and H Vedder, European Environmental Law 
After Lisbon (Groningen, Europa, 2012). In essence, legality review allows for judicial review in national courts so that 
alleged abuses of Member State discretion under ‘conditional’ provisions of directives do not remain unchallengeable in the 
courts. 
40 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Friends of the Earth [1994] 2 CMLR 760; and on appeal [1996] 1 
CMLR 117. 
41 Albeit that this appears to have been a last-minute submission rather than a developed argument made orally or in writing. 
As Schieman J (as he then was) noted at first instance, ‘The submission is not foreshadowed in the Form 86A and has not 
been the subject of detailed argument in front of me’ [74]. 
42 As Counsel for FoE argued at [72]-[74]: ‘the Community citizen has had since 1985 a right under Community law to 
wholesome water; such a right must be enforceable. Under the Act the only method of enforcement at the hands of an 
individual is that provided by section 22 and this only arises once an enforcement order has been made. Therefore, by not 
making an enforcement order the Secretary of State deprives the individual of the possibility of enforcing his right under 
Community law.’ 
FoE’s then water campaigner Liana Stupples does not mention a right to clean drinking water at all.43 
The FoE press release of 23 March 199444 does mention a right to clean and wholesome drinking 
water, but only once and on the second page. The main frame adopted is, rather, a ‘polluter pays’ one 
(with four explicit references and one implicit one). 
Contrast this with the recent ClientEarth challenge to the UK government’s inaction over air quality.45 
The case is the mirror image of FoE: there is no mention of rights in the legal judgments themselves46 
– no doubt because it is now clear that rights are not a condition of direct effect. Mention of the 
substantive right to air quality comes, instead, strongly emphasised in ClientEarth’s publicity around 
the case. Thus its February 2014 press release begins with the statement that ‘We believe that 
everyone has the right to breathe clean air. That's why we brought our successful air pollution case 
against the UK to the Supreme Court.’47 CEO James Thornton is subsequently quoted as saying ‘We 
have the right to breathe clean air and the government has a legal duty to protect us from air 
pollution.’48 In an earlier press release commenting on the Supreme Court’s call for an expedited 
hearing by the Court of Justice, ClientEarth lawyer Alan Andrews stated: ‘We can’t afford to wait for 
this case to grind its way through the courts. The longer these limits are broken, the more people will 
die. We need a landmark ruling on our right to clean air in 2013’ before going on to comment ‘We 
have a right to breathe clean air – this is another big step forward in making that right a reality.’49 And 
the press release after the final 2015 Supreme Court victory similarly observed: ‘The historic ruling is 
the culmination of a five year legal battle fought by ClientEarth for the right of British people to 
breathe clean air … Air pollution kills tens of thousands of people in this country every year. We 
brought our case because we have a right to breathe clean air and today the Supreme Court has upheld 
that right.’50 
This is important socio-legally. Just because substantive legislative environmental rights are not 
juridically necessary for direct effect, does not mean that the campaigning power of explicit rights 
framing cannot be successfully employed outside court. To do the latter, one of course needs some 
idea of when it makes sense to marshal such claims. This inevitably takes us back to the case law on 
incorrect transposition (as well as the law on state liability and other recent Aarhus-related case-law, 
to be considered below) because the Court has conceptually wrestled with these ideas there. It clearly 
makes sense to employ extra-judicial rights framing in cases like ClientEarth, where the air quality 
directive was aimed at the substantive protection of human health. What then of possible extra-
judicial rights framing in cases which are not intended to protect human health? It may be useful to 
draw a distinction here between directives which are aimed at providing a substantive level of 
environmental quality and those which are aimed at procedural environmental protection. In terms of 
framing it does not make sense for environmental social movement organisations like FoE or 
ClientEarth to employ a rights frame in media campaigning on substantive environmental provisions 
                                                          
43 The Times, July 27, 1993. 
44 On file with the author. 
45 Culminating in the Supreme Court’s judgment in R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28. 
46 Similarly, there is no mention of rights in the Court’s previous ruling in Case C-237/07 Janecek [2008] ECR I-6221, 
which is the key precedent on air quality on which the ClientEarth case is based.  
47 ClientEarth, ‘Illegal traffic pollution, the Queen and ClientEarth’, 24 February 2014, available at 
www.clientearth.org/201402242456/news/latest-news/illegal-traffic-pollution-the-queen-and-clientearth-2456. 
48 ibid. 
49 ClientEarth, ‘Supreme court calls on Europe to fast-track UK air pollution case’, 17 July 2013, available at 
www.clientearth.org/201307172236/news/press-releases/supreme-court-calls-on-europe-to-fast-track-uk-air-pollution-case-
2236. 
50 ClientEarth, ‘UK Supreme Court orders Government to take “immediate action” on air pollution’, 29 April 2015, available 
at www.clientearth.org/news/press-releases/uk-supreme-court-orders-government-to-take-immediate-action-on-air-pollution-
2843. 
which are not intended to protect human health. Thus, it may be a stretch to frame the Water 
Framework Directive in terms of a right to water quality of ‘good’ ecological status as required by the 
Directive.51 This status is, after all, an ecological quality standard52 and one would conceivably have 
to be arguing for an ecocentric environmental right for such a frame to fit.53 
However, it makes more sense to adopt a rights frame in connection with many more obviously54 
procedural environmental directives.55 This is self-evidently true of procedural directives, such as 
Directive 2003/4/EC on Access to Environmental Information, which use the explicit language of a 
right (of access to information) within the text. However, it is also true where a procedural 
environmental directive does not use the language of rights but rather sets out various obligations. 
Thus, with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU for example, it is possible to 
conceive of the obligations it contains as creating procedural rights to an EIA which are enforceable 
in the national courts.56 That may of course in part be because while EIA encompasses ecological 
issues, it also involves assessment of impacts on human health.57 As recital 13 of the EIA Directive’s 
preamble states, ‘The effects of a project on the environment should be assessed in order to take 
account of concerns to protect human health, to contribute by means of a better environment to the 
quality of life, to ensure maintenance of the diversity of species and to maintain the reproductive 
capacity of the ecosystem as a basic resource for life.’ In fact the Court has framed the EIA Directive 
in rights terms without even explicitly linking this to health, as we shall see in the state liability 
section below.58 In any event, the point is that on either basis (health-related or not), the EIA Directive 
clearly lends itself to extra-judicial rights framing. 
State Liability  
Although the enjoyment of an individual right is not a condition of direct effect, it is an explicit 
condition of state liability under Francovich/Brasserie du Pecheur.59 In the context of such a damages 
claim in the Leth60 case, the Court ruled that the EIA Directive: 
confers on the individuals concerned a right to have the effects on the environment of the 
project under examination assessed by the competent services.61 
                                                          
51 Which is not to say that the WFD does not lend itself to rights framing: other, procedural parts such as art 14 which 
provides for public information and consultation could easily be framed in rights terms. 
52 W Howarth, ‘The Progression Towards Ecological Quality Standards’ (2006) 18 Journal of Environmental Law 3. 
53 Cf Case C‑ 240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK [2011] ECR I-1255: ‘In the absence of EU rules governing the 
matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions 
for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, in this case the Habitats Directive, since the Member States 
are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case’ [47]. However, this is more in the nature 
of a procedural right to invoke the Directive rather than expressing that the Directive confers substantive rights as such. 
54 The WFD also has procedural elements (see n 51), but it is not uniquely procedural in nature (see further W Howarth, 
‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities’ (2009) 
21 Journal of Environmental Law 391). 
55 On EU legislative procedural environmental rights, see further Ole Pedersen, ‘European Environmental Human Rights and 
Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?’ (2008) 21 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 73. 
56 de Sadeleer (n 8). 
57 Wennerås (n 38). 
58 See also ibid. AG Sharpston (Opinion in Case C-115/09 Trianel [2011] ECR I-3673, [38]-[40]) and de Sadeleer (n 8) 
correctly argue that a health element should not be required to enforce an environmental directive like the EIA in national 
courts; however, this is not the same as considering whether a rights frame makes sense and may be beneficial from a 
campaigning perspective in such cases. They argue the same for nature conservation cases, where, again in extra-judicial 
campaigning terms, a rights frame looks less apposite than for EIA (which has a dual purpose – environmental and human 
health). 
59 Case C-6/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and 
Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029. 
60 Case C‑ 420/11 Leth v Austria [2013] 3 CMLR 2. For a useful blog account of the case, see Hans Vedder, European Law 
Blog, 27 March 2013, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1630. 
What is noticeable is that the Court did not make any connection with human health here. Thus, just 
as one should not draw conclusions for the case law on direct effect from the case law on incorrect 
transposition, so too one should be wary of drawing conclusions from the latter case law for the 
jurisprudence on state liability. In the event, although the applicant – whose house had lost value 
because of increased aircraft noise from an airport expansion at Vienna-Schwechat on which an EIA 
had not been conducted – satisfied the rights condition of state liability, they failed on the causation 
hurdle.62 The fact that Leth remains the only environmental state liability claim heard by the Court63 is 
almost certainly because the sufficiently serious breach and causation conditions are very difficult to 
satisfy in environmental cases. 
 
Fundamental Rights 
With fundamental environmental rights, although there were very few cases at all before 2009 when 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights became binding, since that time we have seen reasonably large 
numbers of cases involving procedural fundamental rights. In the Inuit case64 for example, the Court 
ruled that Article 47 of the Charter (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) was not intended to 
change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties (including its restrictive rules on 
standing under challenge here). There are also a number of examples of cases involving substantive 
fundamental environmental rights. Thus in Križan65 for example, a landfill site operator failed to show 
that the annulment of a permit by a national court on grounds of infringement of the IPPC Directive 
96/61 was in itself an unlawful interference with its right to property in Article 17 of the Charter. 
However, the majority of these substantive fundamental environmental cases have, like Križan, been 
what one might characterise as anti-environmental cases brought by industry and involve property 
rights as the relevant substantive right. While there has been the occasional pro-environmental 
procedural fundamental rights claim – such as R (Edwards) v Environment Agency,66 where the right 
to an effective remedy in article 47 of the Charter was said to support the requirement that the costs of 
bringing legal proceedings in domestic environmental cases should not be ‘prohibitively expensive’ – 
there have been no pro-environmental substantive fundamental rights claims brought by the 
individuals or environmental groups. How then do we account for that, on the face of it, surprising 
lack? 
The first explanation is one of redundancy: there will often simply be no need to bring a claim based 
on a breach of EU substantive fundamental rights, because other legal avenues are much more likely 
to be followed instead. To appreciate this, one needs to set out the various possible types of 
environmental incidents and disputes that might arise. It will then be seen that very few of these are 
likely seriously to engage EU ECHR-derived general principles or equivalent Charter fundamental 
rights. First, there is the severe pollution incident type. This is the type of dispute which we know can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
61 [44]. See also [32], which describes the right very much in Hohfeldian correlative terms: ‘the Court has already ruled that 
an individual may, where appropriate, rely on the duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment under Article 2(1) of 
Directive 85/337, read in conjunction with Articles 1(2) and 4 thereof (see Case C‑ 201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, para 
61). That directive thus confers on the individuals concerned a right to have the environmental effects of the project under 
examination assessed by the competent services and to be consulted in that respect.’ 
62 In principle, causation is for the national courts to determine; however the Court left little room for doubt here as to the 
chances of success. 
63 There is an example in the UK national courts – Bowden v South West Water [1998] Env LR 445 – involving a substantive 
legislative right under the Shellfish Waters Directive 79/923/EEC [1979] OJ L281/47 (since replaced by Directive 
2006/113/EC [2006] OJ L376/14). 
64 n 13. 
65 Case C-416/10 Križan [2013] Env LR 28. 
66 Case C-260/11 R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2013] 3 CMLR 18 [33]. 
trigger substantive ECHR fundamental rights in a European Convention context.67 However, in an EU 
context, these incidents take place on the territory of Member States and most will involve obvious 
breaches of national law, typically with no real need to bring EU law into the equation. Where 
national law fails applicants in this type of severe pollution case, they take their cases to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg for breaches of the ECHR, and not the CJEU in Luxembourg 
for breach of EU fundamental rights law.68 Second, there is the type of case involving a challenge to 
national action (or inaction) which fails to comply with relevant EU environmental legislation. Here, 
there is again simply no need to rely on EU fundamental rights because applicants can avail 
themselves, much more straightforwardly, of EU legislative rights via legal doctrines such as direct 
effect or legality review (albeit, as we have seen, that these rights may not need to be pleaded in 
express rights terms).  
Third, there is the type of case where an applicant wants to challenge an EU action or item of EU 
legislation, whether for being too strong (industry) or too weak (environmental movement actors). 
This type of case could well in theory involve reference to fundamental rights as a basis for such a 
challenge, but legal opportunity69 is poor in practice for two reasons. One reason is a lack of standing 
before the CJEU (restrictive for both environmental interests and industry) – in other words an 
inability for an applicant to gain access to the Court. The restrictive legacy of the Plaumann70 case has 
cast a long shadow. It is, however, possible to make such challenges in the national courts instead and 
not be faced with this standing hurdle at EU level. Standley71 provides a good example of such a case, 
with farmers challenging the Nitrates Directive 91/676/EEC72 in the UK national courts. The other 
reason is more to do with restrictive precedent or poor ‘legal stock’ as an aspect of legal opportunity.73 
In essence, ECHR case law does not come to the assistance of claimants who are arguing that future 
risks pose a threat. For ECHR rights to be triggered, the relevant risk must be imminent.74 And of 
course in most cases where an environmental NGO might be mounting a substantive challenge to 
weak EU environmental action, it will be on the basis that the EU is not doing enough to address a 
non-imminent, future risk. Standley, in contrast, was a substantive industry challenger – and such 
litigants will almost invariably (though, as in Standley, typically unsuccessfully) be claiming in 
national courts that what they perceive as excessively strong national environmental regulation is 
based on parent EU legislation which is unlawful because it breaches their fundamental right to 
property. 
Finally, there are environmental protest cases like Schmidberger75 or, to take a UK national court 
example, the Scottish case Cairn Energy v Greenpeace.76 Cairn Energy was seeking an interdict 
(injunction) against Greenpeace International in relation to direct action occupation of Cairn’s offices 
in Edinburgh. Part of Greenpeace’s legal argument was that an interdict would interfere with 
                                                          
67 eg Lopez Ostra and Fadeyeva (n 2). 
68 The current paper concerns EU law; however, it is worth noting that environmental social movement organisations are 
typically invisible within the European Convention system, even if environmental rights themselves are not, because of 
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72 [1991] OJ L375/1.  
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fundamental rights to freedom of expression and information and to freedom of assembly and 
association under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR and Articles 11 and 12 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The case itself does not take one very far: this is in part because the judge 
dismissed the interdict on other grounds and hence did not consider the rights point beyond an obiter 
mention; and partly because it is hard to assess whether the case did indeed fall within the scope of 
EU law to make the Charter applicable in any event. However, it is of course likely that future 
environmental protest cases will engage Charter rights, just as past cases like Schmidberger have 
engaged ECHR fundamental rights.77 This type of case, in other words, is likely to be an exception in 
visibility terms: in comparison with the previous three case scenarios cited above where EU 
fundamental environmental rights are unlikely to get a hearing, in the protest scenario they are much 
more likely to be made visible. That said, this is only ever likely to be in the context of reactive rather 
than proactive litigation on the part of the environment movement:78 in other words, as in both Cairn 
Energy and Schmidberger, it was not the environment movement itself bringing the claim but, rather, 
a company under pressure from the movement, with protest rights (to free expression and assembly) 
employed as a defence by the latter. 
 
Conclusion 
That procedural rights have become highly visible is no surprise, given the Aarhus-isation of EU 
environmental law over the last decade or so. However, given the powerful language of rights, one 
might perhaps have expected the environmental movement to have brought more rights-based claims 
to substantive environmental quality than we have seen. Such cases – in relation to both legislative 
rights and fundamental rights – have been thin on the ground.  
I argued that the explanation for this puzzle could be found, in the case of legislative substantive 
rights, in the lack of a juridical need for a right within direct effect and the steep barrier posed by the 
other conditions for state liability which have left its rights promise underdeveloped as a result. In the 
case of fundamental substantive rights, I suggested that it was a feature of both redundancy and 
restrictive precedent. Either (in eg severe pollution cases) there is simply no need to bring cases 
within an EU framework because there are other more obvious avenues available to those who have 
suffered potential rights breaches, or (with eg challenges to legislation) the law on fundamental rights 
does not lend itself to environment movement challenges in the same way as it does to industry. 
It remains to be seen whether this situation might change. The recent UK ClientEarth use of rights 
framing, albeit extra-judicially in its publicity rather than in the legal proceedings themselves, 
provides some hope that substantive EU environmental rights may yet have a brighter future.79 
 
 
                                                          
77 Because of eg a threat to free movement caused by the protest activity as in Schmidberger. 
78 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (Abingdon, Routledge, 1992); Vanhala (n 73); C Hilson, ‘UK Climate 
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